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Abstract-This paper treats the problem of allocating a scarce resource over time. It is 
assumed that a federal tax is placed on the consumption of the resource in order to 
discourage initially high and wasteful usage under free market conditions. The resource is 
thereby conserved in the interest of more efficient usage later on when it becomes 
increasingly scarce. It is assumed that a saving technology is in the works which, at some 
future, random, time, will provide an alternative resource or device that will essentially 
eliminate economic dependency on the scarce resource. The problem is, that if too much 
resource is set aside in the near future, the saving technology may render this sacrifice a 
useless gesture in conservation; on the other hand, if too little is set aside, there will be 
unnecessary hardship when the resource runs out. As the arrival time of the saving 
technology is not known in advance, the problem is to determine the optimal trade-offs 
between using too much at the start (and then running out) and not using enough at the 
start (and not needing it later when the technology arrives): Once the optimal consumption 
pattern is determined, the next problem is to devise a taxing strategy which encourages 
consumption to obey the desired pattern. 
COMMENTS ON BASIC MODEL 
Assume an economy which consists of many identical households or a single price-taking 
household. Also assume there is at least one scarce resource, and pick one of these for study. 
The problem is to determine (a) what is the optimal consumption rate of this resource and 
(b) how can this consumption rate be brought about by government axation policy? 
Suppose there are initially Q units of this scarce resource and that the utility of using r(t) dt 
units of the resource during l to t + dt is u(r) dt. An important aspect of this model is that 
we do not discount utility back to the present time. We assume that future users derive the 
same benefits from r(t) dt as do current users (for the same usage rate), provided the future 
user needs the resource. We assume that U(T) is a strictly monotonically increasing, concave, 
thrice differentiated function over the region of interest. 
In most studies of maximizing the total utility obtained from consuming scarce resources, 
the idea of time discounting is crucial in order to make the problem tractable. Otherwise, the 
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optimal solution would be to consume the resource at an infinitesimal rate; non-zero 
allocations become suboptimal because of the concavity of u(r). While discounting paves the 
way to non-trivial solutions, it appears to be unfair to say that, in maximizing total discounted 
utility, current users somehow should be afforded more pleasure than future users. This seems 
not to fit in with the overall idea behind discounting, in which consumption is foregone today 
to allow for greater consumption tomorrow. 
Rather than take the discounting approach to get non-trivial solutions, we have adopted 
in this paper what we believe to be a more realistic approach which is based on the following 
argument: If we take gasoline, for example, to be our scarce resource, the main argument 
for greater consumption today than fifty years from now is that we expect the arrival of 
technological break-throughs to enable future generations to do without this resource. Thus, 
it is not so much that the future generations wouldn’t enjoy gasoline usage or that their use 
of this resource should be discounted in the planning (which implies they somehow are less 
important in the scheme of things); rather, less should be allocated for the future because they 
may not need it. 
The central idea of this paper, then, is to postulate a probability distribution, f(t), for a 
technological breakthrough which will essentially eliminate the need for the resource. A 
objective function is developed which maximizes total expected utility, in which utility is in 
no way discounted. Thus, future generations have the same “rights and priviliges” as current 
users, but they end up with less allocation simply because they may not need it. 
THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION MODEL 
The problem is to maximize total expected utility, subject to the resource constraint. We 
assume that the arrival of the technological breakthrough renders the resource essentially 
valueless, so scrap value considerations are not necessary. Lettingf(t) be the true probability 
density function for the arrival time of the technological breakthrough, we have the following 
problem: 
s cc mtiy z[r(.>l = u[r(t)]P(t) dt = co u[r*(t)]P(t) dt 0 s 0 (la) 
subject to 
and 
s 
cc 
r(t) dt = Q (lb) 
0 
r(t) 2 0 (t 2 0) UC) 
where we assume there is at least one maximum in eqn (l), and where P(t) is the probability 
the resource will be needed at time t : 
P(r) = “f(x) dx 
s I 
(2) 
The argument in (la) is the expected utility arising from r(t) dt during t to t + dt. This utility 
is u[r(t)]dt, provided the breakthrough has not yet arrived. If the breakthrough has come, 
the utility is zero. 
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For convenience, we assume P(t) is a continuous, strictly monotonically decreasing 
function, from t = 0 out to the time when P = 0 (which may be at t = co). 
THEOREM 1. If r*(.) exists, then it is unique, and there exist values of K and T, where T 
may be infinity, in which r*(.) is a solution to System (3). Further, no other triplet, 
{r(.), K, T>, satisfies (3). 
P(t)$[r(t)]=K (O<t<T) (34 
s T r(t) dt = Q (3b) 0 
r(t)>0 (01tcT) (3c) 
r(t)=0 (T- <t) (3d) 
Proof. Note that, for a given K, (3d) requires that r(T - ) = 0, so that r(t) is the solutio;l 
to (3a) until it is no longer possible to have a solution. In effect, (3) requires that we look 
at all solutions to (3a) over (0, co) and pick the one solution which is both continuous over 
(0, cc) and which satisfies (3b). While the problem in (1) falls in the general area of the 
calculus of variations, it has enough twists that we enclose a proof here (in fact, we could 
find no particular theorem which solves (1) directly). Now consider any feasible perturbation, 
g(.), to r*(.). Then 
g(t) + r*(t) 2 0 (0 I t) (4) 
s 30 g(t) dt = 0. 0 
Further, Eg(.) is also a feasible perturbation for 0 I c I 1. The following is straightforward: 
z(t) = s Oc P(t)u[r*(t) + cg(t)] dt (6) 0 
dz 
-1 =/mP(t)g [r*(t)lg(t)dt 
dco o 
d*z Oc 
_= 
s de* o 
P(t) 2 [r*(t) + Mt)lg*(t) dt 
(7) 
If r*(.) exists, it is clear that dz/dcl, can be made positive unless (3a) is satisfied when r > 0, 
simply by setting g > 0 for large Pu’ and g < 0 for low Pu’, all the while maintaining (4) and 
(5). We skip this obvious part of the proof. It is also clear that (3b) is satisfied for any feasible 
r(.). It therefore remains to show that r*(t) > 0 for 0 I t < T* and r*(T* - ) = 0. That is, 
(3a) holds over all t in which it is possible to get a solution. Equivalently, 
P(T*) = K*/[du(O)/dr] (9) 
Suppose first that r*(t) = 0 over some region, [r, - 6, r,], with 7, < T* in (9), and that 
r*(t) > 0 over some region, [z2 - 6, r,], where z2 > r,. Then let g(t) = r*(z2) = A for 
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t E [z, - 6, z,] and g(t) = -A for t E [z2 - 6, ~1. Then g(t) satisfies (4) and (5), and, from (7), 
dz ‘1 
-1 =s 
‘2 
de o 
P(t)u’(O)A dt - 
s 
K*A dt 
7, -6 r2 - 6 
2 AG[u'(O)P(z,) - P(z,)u'[r*(~,)ll (10) 
> 0. 
Note that (10) is valid since u’(0) > u’[r(z,)] and P(rJ > P(z,). We conclude from (10) that, 
ifr*(T+)=O,thenr*(t)=Ofort>T.Nowsupposer*(T-)>Owithr*(T+)=O,where 
T < co. Let g(t) = r*(T - ) = A for T < t < T + 6 and g(t) = -A for T - 6 < t < T. Then 
g(.) satisfies (4) and (5), and, from (7), 
dz 
-I s 
T T+6 
dt o= - 
K*Adt + 
r-6 s 
P(t)u’(O)Adt 
T 
2 -P(T)u’[r*(T -)]A6 + P(T + +‘(O)Ab 
> 0 for small 6) (11) 
As z’(0) > 0 in (11) for 6 sufficiently small, due to the continuity in P and the fact that 
u’[r*(T - )] < u’(O), we conclude that r*(T - ) = 0. Thus, if r*(.) is optimal, it satisfies (3), 
and dz/dc(, I 0. Also, from (8) d*z/dc’ < 0 for 0 5 6 I 1 for all g(.) with positive @ Pg2dt. 
Thus to have an alternate optimal at r* + g, it must be true that g = 0 when P > 0. Since 
g 2 0 when P = 0 is required for feasibility, then from (5) we have g = 0. Thus, any feasible 
g(.) not identically zero will yield a lower z. From the first portion of this proof, we therefore 
note that g + r* does not satisfy (3), so r* is the unique solution to (3). Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1. Let rK(*) be the solution to (3a) over [0, TK), where 
TK = sup {t ( P(t)u’[rK(t)] 2 K} (12) 
Then rK-+rK* uniformly over [0, co] as K-K*. 
Proof. As P(t)J, then du/dr increases with t, and therefore rK(t)J with it. Note that 
rK > rx7 when K -c K* and that 
= $[rCt)l[rAtt - r,df)l 
where r&t) < r(t) < rK(t). Thus, 
SUP 1 r&) - r&t) 1 s 
[K-K*[ 
O<f<A 
c 
A 
P(A) 
where 
CA = inf [r&A) I r 5 rK(0) > 0. 
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Note that C, > 0 because U” < 0 everywhere over rlr(A) I r I rK(0). Thus, 
385 
lim sup IrK(t) - r&t) 1 = 0. 
K-K*- OSfSA 
Thus, 
lim sup (rK(t) - rK*(f)( = 0. 
K-XI-O<t<m 
THEOREM 2. If u’(0) < co, then r*(.) exists. 
Proof. Define &(I) as the solution to (3) for a given K, and define TK and QK as follows: 
TK = sup {t IP(t)u’(O) L K} (12) 
QK = ‘?-,(t) dt 
s 0 
(13) 
Since rK(f) I rK(0) < co, and since T, < 03, then QK exists. Further, Q, = co. Now define 
K, = u’(0). (14) 
Then rKo(t) = 0 and Q. = co. As QK is continuous (a direct result of Lemma 1 and TK < a), 
and as it is easy to show QK is strictly monotonically decreasing in K, then it is clear there 
must exist precisely one value of K, say K*, in which QP = Q. Then (3) is satisfied for the 
triplet, {r,.(t), K*, T*}, and r*(.) exists. Q.E.D. 
THEOREM 3. If 1; P dt < co, then r*(.) exists. 
Proof. Define TK and QK as in (12) and (13) respectively. Assume u’(0) = co, for otherwise 
the theorem is proved by Theorem 2. Then 
T,=sup{tIP(t)>O}=T. (15) 
To prove this theorem, we show that Q, = co, Q, = 0 and QK is strictly monotonically 
decreasing and continuous. Thus, there is precisely one K, say K*, in which QK = Q, and (3) 
is satisfied for this K* and Tp. We skip the trivial parts of showing QKJ and Q, = co. If 
TK < 00, then QK exists and is continuous (by an analysis similar to Theorem 2), so we assume 
T = cc (i.e. P(t) > 0 for all t). Thus 
QK = 
s 
CD rK(t) dt. 
0 
Define 
s cc z,= POMrK(t)l dt. 0 
Then 
s 30 G I +b-,dO)I P(r) dt < co, (K > 0). 0 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
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Next define 
QK(T> = ‘rK(t) d  s 0 
where 
Define 
QK(a) = QF 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
Then it is easy to show that the optimal solution, r&(s), to (21) is 
From (18) 
rZ,Af) = 
rK(t) (f < T) 
0 (t > T)’ 
z, = ZZ(co) < co. 
(22) 
(23) 
Thus, QK exists for, otherwise, Z;(T) could be made arbitrarily large by increasing T. Next, 
we show continuity in QK for all K as follows: 
s m lim Q, - QK = lim (rX - rK) dt X-K X-K o 
= !j% 
s 
A (rx - rK) dt + lim m (r, - rK) dt 
- 0 s X-rK A 
The first limit above vanishes by Lemma 1. The second limit vanishes by the existence of Qx 
and QK. Finally, we show Q, = 0. 
Suppose that 
s 
30 
lim r,dt =c( >O. (25) 
K-m 0 
Then, since r,(t)*0 for all t, we have 
s m lim r,dt = u, all A. (26) K-m /, 
(26) is impossible since QK exists. Q.E.D. Theorem 3. 
COMMENTS 
By way of note, if u’(0) = cc and jP dt = co, then z may or may not be bounded. For 
example, if 24 = r ‘D and P = t -1/4, then it is easy to show z is unbounded. On the other hand, 
if P decreases much more rapidly (e.g. P(t) N t -3’4), then z is bounded. 
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Incidently, it is easy to show that, if z is bounded, then r* exists. A brief summary of the 
proof involves defining z: as the optimal z when r = 0 is required for t > T. We can show 
that the optimal r is rK(t), where K = K(T) and where K is chosen to uniquely satisfy (3b). 
As z is bounded, then zr+z* and K(T)-+K*. Then, from the arguments in the lemmas, we 
can show that rK.(.) satisfies (3). 
EXAMPLE PROBLEM 
Suppose u = r ‘/’ and P = e-l’ (i.e. the arrival of the saving technology obeys the Poisson 
model). Then u’(O) = cc and P > 0 for all t, so r*(t) > 0 for all t. Note that JOp P dt = l/n, 
so from Theorem 3 we are guaranteed the existence of r*(.). From (3a), we get 
Thus, 
0 5 e-$ - l/2 - K - . (27) 
r = e - 2ir/4K2. (28) 
From (3b) we have 
Q= ~ ~ s memZirdt = 1 ,, 4K2 UK2 ’ (29) 
Thus, 
Thus, 
K* = (81Q)-“2. (30) 
r*(t) = 2J,Q e-2i’. (31) 
DISCUSSION OF OPTIMAL SOLUTION 
Intuitively we view (3a) as follows: Suppose we trade some resource scheduled for use 
during (t, t + dt), and the amount given is dr. Then the gain in total z will be 
dz = P(r)% [r(z)] dr dt - P(t) $ [r(t)] dr dt. (32) 
The signs would be reversed if resources at z were to be assigned for use at t. Therefore, in 
order not to create an increase in z in either of the two cases, which is the case when r = r*, 
we must require dz = 0, in which case we have (3a) immediately. 
While requirement (3b) is obvious, it is not clear why we also require (3~) and (3d). In 
essence, we require that r*(.) be the one solution satisfying (3a) and (3b) which also drops 
to zero at its termination point (which may be at infinity). If K is chosen too high, then (3b) 
will not be satisfied; if K is chosen too low, then (3b) will be satisfied at a point in time at 
which r(t) > 0. We now make a comment on optimality, which concerns the continuity of 
r over (0, co) and which is really what (3~) and (3d) are implying. If, to the contrary, r were 
to abruptly drop to zero at some time, T, the solution would only be piecewise continuous. 
It is easy to show that a simple perturbation of this solution near T will result in an 
improvement (if a small amount of resource normally used just prior to T were shifted for 
use just after T, then, because of the assumed strict concavity of u, the trade would result 
in an improvement in z). 
The reason why z may not exist if u’(O) = cc and f P dt = co is due to the possibility of 
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trading resources allocated for low r and spreading it out into the infinite future, all the while 
improving z. In effect, P(t) decreases so slowly that J 0” rK dt = co, no matter how large is k. 
OPTIMAL TAXING SCHEMES 
We assume that, if the household chooses to consume r(t), it is taxed an additional 
amount, qb(t)r(t), which goes to the government for subsequent usage via transfers back to 
the household. The tax is therefore assumed to be in units of the resource, and the government 
takes control of the taxed units. We also assume that the economy behaves, at any given time 
t, as if it had a finite time horizon, T. In essence, this assumption is equivalent to having a 
“constant people-mix” in the economy. Incidentally, a different assumption leads to the same 
results: namely, that the people at t = 0 live to t = T, die off, and a new group takes over 
at that time, and so on. The number of people in the economy is assumed constant. 
We now show that the only procedures the taxing authority can use to induce a real 
consumption rate of r*(.) in the economy is to tax away all the excess resource during (0, T) 
and then make transfer payments thereafter of r*(t). 
Assume that transfer payments are A(.), and note that the rate, R(t), at which the 
household gives up resources, and the real consumption rate, r(t), are related as follows: 
R(t) = r(tU + 4(f>l. (33) 
The maximization problem the household faces at time r is: 
s r+T Maxz = P(th[r(t)l dt T 
s 
r+T 
s 
?+T 
r(tW + 4(t>l dt = Q(r) + h(t) dt 
r 7 
Q(z)=Q - 
s 
‘(r(t)[l+4(t)]-h(t))dt>O. 
0 
(344 
Wb) 
(34c) 
From (34b) and (34c), we have an equivalent statement: 
s r+T [r(l + 4) - h] dt = Q. (34d) 0 
Finally, transfers must be available from the government reserves: 
From (33) and (34a), 
z = j;+TF’(f)u [$$]dt. (35) 
Then, supposing R * is the optimal, and perturbing this to R * + cg(t) along the lines discussed 
previously, we get 
(36) 
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Consequently, 
R* 1 
P(t)u’ - 
[ 1 ~ = K. 1+4 1+6 
If the economy uses up the resources at the proper long term rate, then 
R*(t) ~ = r*(t). 
1 + d(t) 
Thus, from (37), 
K*= K. 
1 + 4(t) 
Thus, 
4(t) = 4 = constant 
and, from (34d) for r = 0, we get 
Then 
where 
Q = [r*(t)[l + 41 -h(t)] dt. 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
s T A= h(t) dt (43) 0 
T 
B= 
s 
r*(t) dt. (44) 
0 
Thus, once h(t) over (0, T) is specified, the necessary tax is determined from (42). We now 
find Q(T), the amount of resource remaining with the households at T. From (34~) 
Q(T>=Q- ‘[r*(t)(l+4)-h(t)]dt 
s 0 
=Q-(l++)B-A 
= 0. (45) 
Thus, the taxing agency has all the resources at T. 
We now show that the only solution beyond t = T in which r = r* is for the economy to 
be completely controlled by the government (i.e. h = (1 + 4)r*). 
Note that, if h(t) = (1 + $)r*(t), then it is trivial to show that the optimal feasible r is r* 
(simply because the household could not do better even if it got its entire payments scheduled 
over (r, z + T) in a lump sum at s). Note also that, in order for the optimal r to be r*, we 
require that, for r > T, 
I:“hdt ={:“&*dt =J:“(l+$)r*(t)dt. (46) 
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From (46) it is trivial to show that 
h(t) = (1 + 4)?-*(t), (t > r>. (47) 
These results are summarized below: 
THEOREM 4. The transfer payments over (0, T) may follow any schedule. However, for any 
given h(.) over (0, T), there is only one tax rate, as given by (42-44), which will induce a real 
usage of I-*(.). This tax rate, which is constant, reduces the resources held by the household 
to zero at t = T. For t > T, the transfer payments must follow (47), and, in effect, the 
household never thereafter has a reserve of resource. 
SUMMARY 
In this paper we have developed an optimal consumption strategy for a scarce resource 
in an economy in which a saving technology is in the works to arrive at some future random 
time. The objective is to maximize total expected utility over all time. There is no discounting; 
all users are treated equally in this sense. However, future users get scheduled for less resource 
because they may not need it. Finally, we showed that should the government tax 
consumption (in units of the resource) to discourage usage for households with a finite time 
horizon, only a constant tax rate will work. Further, the taxing policy is tantamount o taxing 
away all the resource that shouldn’t be used over the household time horizon and then giving 
the households just the right amount of resource from then on (in transfer payments). 
